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INSIDER TRADING AND THE INSIDER
TRADING SANCTIONS ACT OF 1984:
NEW WINE INTO NEW BOTTLES?
DAVID

I.

M. BRODSKY*

INTRODUCTION

On August 10, 1984, President Reagan signed into law the Insider Trading
Act of 1984 (Act),' almost two years after an earlier version was introduced
into the House of Representatives at the request and insistence of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (Commission). 2 Although the Act differs in several
respects from the first bill introduced 3 it does give the Commission the weapon
it sought against so-called "insider trading"-the trebling of the civil monetary
sanction and the increasing of the criminal fine that a court can impose upon
a finding that a person or entity has engaged in unlawful trading in violation
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)." But in light of the suspicion that the Commission's ultimate goal in its acknowledged crusade5 against
insider trading is really to eliminate, under the banner of "unfairness," all
trading by persons in possession of material nonpublic information, 6 the Act
*

LL.B., Harvard University (1967); B.A., Brown University (1964). Mr. Brodsky is a

member of the New York law firm of Schulte Roth & Zabel and of the New York and District
of Columbia Bars.
1. P.L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984), reprinted in 2 FED. SEC. L. RE'. (CCH)
20,152R, 20,357, 20,366, 20,474, 20,484, 20,484A, 20,601 (1984) [hereinafter cited as The Act].
2. See Memorandum of Securities and Exchange Commission In Support of the Insider
Trader Sanctions Act of 1982, reprintedin 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 38, 1705-08 (Oct.
1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum In Support].
3. See H.R. REP. No. 98-355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2274 (report of House version of the Act, H.R. 559) [hereinafter cited as HousE
REPORT]. The House version of the Act, H.R. 559, was passed on September 19, 1983. Subsequently, H.R. 559, as introduced into the Senate, S.910, was amended and finally passed by
House and Senate, without a conference. Neither the Senate Banking Committee, nor a SenateHouse conference, prepared a report. Instead, the House Report, as amended by Senator D'Amato
by floor remarks on June 19, 1984, and as further amended by floor comments of Congressmen
Dingell and Broyhill, is the only comprehensive source of the legislative history. See 130 CONG.
REc. S.8912-14 (dail ed. June 29, 1984); 130 CONG. R~c. H.7756-60 (daily ed. July 25, 1984).
There were three sets of public hearings on the two bills. See The Insider Trading Sanctions
Act of 1983: Hearingson H.R. 559 Before the House Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, andFinance, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings
I]; The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983: Hearingson H.R. 559 Before the Subcomm.
on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection,andFinance,98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984)[hereinafter
cited as House HearingsI1]; Hearingson S.910 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Securities, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
5. See Address by John R. Fedders to Compliance and Legal Seminar of the Securities
Industry Association (Apr. 26, 1982).
6. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part,401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).

921

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:921

raises troubling questions concerning the Act's eventual scope. In particular,
the Act fails to answer the following critical questions: (1) what types of
persons-insiders, quasi-insiders, outside consultants, tippees, brokers-are
subject to the new sanctions?; (2) what acts of such persons constitute the
proscribed activity?; (3) what kind of information-corporate or market, or
both-is regulated by the Act?; and (4) what is the standard of causation which
the Commission must prove to make out a violation of the Act?
The thesis of this article is that the Act may do more than its professed
sole objective of not changing the substantive law but only adding a new layer
of sanctions. The Act in fact may change the law of "insider trading" in significant respects. Particularly, the definition of the acts, persons, and type of
information subject to the new Act, as well as the standard of causation, is
far more pressing a problem than before the Act was passed because the risks
of misuse of tainted information-civil and criminal-are now so much higher.7
In addition, since the Act adds to the Commission's arsenal of weapons a
sanction akin to a fine or penalty, civil defendants may now be entitled to
a jury trial of alleged offenses.!

7. As of February 1, 1984, the Commission had brought over 120 enforcement actions
alleging violations of the insider trading proscriptions. Lynch, The Insider Trading Sanctions
Act: New Remedies for the SEC, 31 FED. BAR NEws & J. 166, 167 n.13 (1984). In 1984 there
have been several indictments returned against traders involving novel fact situations and themes
which have not yet been tested fully in administrative or civil proceedings. See infra notes 77-78.
Since 1980, over 40 indictments or criminal informations have been filed in the Southern District
of New York alone. See Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 41-51.
8. See HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 16. The House Committee Report states that the
Supreme Court has reserved judgment on the question whether the right to a jury trial under
the seventh amendment is applicable in government civil penalty actions. See id. The House Report
relies on the Commission's citation to Atlas Roofing Co. v. OccupationalSafety and Health
Review Commission in which the Court declined to address the question of whether a suit in
federal court by the government for civil penalties for violation of a statute is equivalent to a
suit at common law. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n,
430 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (1977). The Committee indicated that the existence of a right to a jury
trial in a penalty action should remain solely a matter of constitutional law and expressed no
view on the proper resolution of this constitutional issue. See HoUsE REPORT, supra note 3, at 16.
In fact, the law on this issue is not ambiguous, despite the Commission's aggressive citation of
Atlas Roofing. An action to recover a statutory penalty generally carries the right to a jury trial.
As Judge Friendly stated in United States v. J.B. Williams Co., "There can be no doubt that
in general 'there is a right of jury trial when the United States sues . . . to collect a penalty,
even though the statute is silent on the right of jury trial.' " United States v. J.B. Williams Co.,
498 F.2d 414, 422-23 (2d Cir. 1974) (quoting 5 J. MooRE, W. TAcGERT & J. WcICE R, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE
38.3111], at 38-235-36 (2d ed. 1971)).
In Hepner v. United States, the leading case in this area, the Supreme Court found a
right to jury trial in an action brought by the United States to collect a penalty pursuant to
the Alien Immigration Act. See Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909). The Court held
that in a civil action to recover a statutory penalty arising from the commission of a public offense. "[t]he defendant was, of course, entitled to have a jury summoned . . . ." Id. at 115.
See United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 47 (1914) (reaffirming that in action to recovery penalty
for alleged violation of Alien Immigration Act "the defendant was entitled to have the issues
tried before a jury"); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Engman, 527 F.2d 1115, 1121
(2d Cir. 1975) (civil penalty under § 5(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act), cert. denied,
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A.

"INsmER TADiNG" PRIOR TO THE ACT:
A SHORT: HISTORY OF RutE 10B-5

Origins: Breach of Fidudary Duty by Corporate Insiders

Section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 are the principal bases" upon which the law
of insider trading has been created by the Commission and the courts. Of
rule lOb-5, Professor Loss has said that "it is difficult-to think of another
instance in the entire corpus juris in which the interaction of the legislativ e,
administrative rulemaking and judicial processes has produced so much from
so little."' 0 Rule 10b-5 was adopted- in haste by the Commission when, in
1943, it was faced with the case of a corporate president buying his company's
shares while simultaneously and falsely telling his company's shareholders that
earnings would be poor."I The Commission based rule -0b-5 upon the theory
that such buying of stock while issuing false statements concerning the value
of the stock not only violated basic common law notions of fiduciary duties
of officers, but also violated strictures against misrepresentation, i.e., fraud.
The Commission's theory had its roots squarelyin common law precedents
sanctioned by the Supreme Courtas early as 1909 int Strong v. Repide,'2 which
426 U.S. 911 (1976). See also Brodsky, Some ClarificationNeeded on Who Is an "Inside Trader,"
N.Y.L.J., April 28, 1983, at 1, col. 3.
The rationale for such decisions is that suits for statutory penalties were-recognized at
common law as part of the action in debt. Accordingly, the right of trial by jury in these cases
is protected by the seventh amendment to the Constitution, which provides in pertinent part that
"[ilnsuits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed [$20J; the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
Moreover, the fact that the action is brought by the government does not deprive the
defendants of their seventh amendment rights. It is well settled that "the right to jury trial exists
in actions by the United States where it would in a similar action between private parties. " Damsky
v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 1961). As with the several statutes identified above, the Act
creates a civil action to recover civil penalties and, therefore, defendants against whom-the Commission seeks sanctions under the Act should have a constitutionally protected right of trial by jury.
9. The analysis of the principal cases involving insider trading will focus exclusively on
cases arising under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5. There are, of course, two other provisions of the
Act and rules regulating so-called "insider trading," § 16 and, in particular § 16(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(b) (1982), dealing with short-swing profits made by insiders, and -rule 14e-3, promulgated
by the Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1984). An analysis of these -important sections is
beyond the scope of this article, but there is an extensive body of literature on § 16,' see, e.g.,
Roth and Watterson, Section 16(b): Business Combination Transactions, 16 REv. SEC. REG. 822
(1983); Yourd, Tradingin Securitiesby Directors, Officers and Stockholders: Section 16 of the
SecuritiesExchange Act, 38 McH. L. Rnv. 133 (1939); see also Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973); and on rule 14e-3, see, e.g., Heller, Chiarella,SEC Rule
14e-3 and Dirks: "Fairness" v. Economic Theory, 37 bus. LAw. 517 (1982); Peloso, & Krause,
Trading on Inside Information, 14 REv. SEc. REG. 941, 947-48 (1981); Phillips, Insider Trading
Liability After Dirks, 16 REv. SEc. REG. 841, 847 (1983); Wang, Recent Developments-in the
FederalLaw Regulating Stock Market Inside-Trading, 6 Corn,. L. Rav. 291, 306-08 (1983).
10. L. Loss, FuN DA~mAts OF SEcuiuns REGULATiON 820 (1983).
'
*
11. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-3 n.32 (1976); Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. LAw. 891, 922 (1967); see also Freeman, The Insider Trading
Sanctions Bill-A Neglected Opportunity, 4 PACE L. REv. 220, 221 (1984).
12. 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:921

held that a major shareholder and general manager of a company was liable
for purchasing a minority shareholder's stock without disclosing the fact that
the company's sale of property was about to take place. Since Strong, most
jurisdictions have found such use of information from inside the corporation
to violate the fiduciary duties of the miscreant corporate officer. Such use
of inside information now was forbidden by rule lOb-513 as well.
The early federal decisions dealt with the so-called "traditional insiders"officers, directors, and controlling shareholders-and spoke generally in terms
of fiduciary relationships as well as fairness.' 4 In dealing with the early cases,
the courts did not analyze with care the particular theory under which liability
would be imposed.'" Thus, common law theories of breaches of fiduciary duty
based on either insiders' "special relationships" or "unfairness" were both
imported into the federal securities laws and transmuted into federal "fraud." '6
B.

"Disclose or Abstain"

When the first case of misuse of inside information came before the Commission, it was prepared to extend such common law theories to persons other
than officers, directors, or controlling shareholders who did not have clear
fiduciary relationships. The case which arose was In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,' 7
and involved a director of Curtiss-Wright Corporation (Curtiss-Wright) who
learned during performance of his duties as a director that Curtiss-Wright
would be reducing its dividend. 8 The director informed a fellow employee
of the brokerage firm where both were employed, who sold his client's shares
in Curtiss-Wright prior to the release of the dividend information to the general
public.' 9 The Commission found that persons other than officers, directors,
or controlling shareholders had a "special obligation" of disclosure when the
following two elements were present:
[F]irst, the existence of the relationship giving access.., to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not
for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness
13. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947); see also Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del.
Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5, 7 (1949) ("[1]f an employee in the course of his employment acquires secret
information relating to his employer's business, he occupies a position of trust and confidence
toward it, analogous in most respects to that of a fiduciary, and must govern his actions accordingly"). But see Loss, supra note 10, at 870 (Supp. 1984).
14. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951); Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
15. See Loss, supra note 10, at 825 n.22.
16. See Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del. 1951) ("Some courts
have called this [duty of disclosure] a fiduciary duty while others state it is a duty imposed by
the 'special circumstances.' ").
17. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
18. Id. at 909.
19. Id.
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involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing
it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.2"
The Commission then found that the seller and the seller's firm, Cady,
Roberts, had violated rule lOb-5, not only because each had a "special obligation," like that of corporate insiders, not to trade on information derived
from a person with access to confidential information arising from a fiduciary
relationship, but also because of the "inherent unfairness" of permitting a
person with access to such secret information to trade on the basis of it while
persons with whom he was trading did not have such access. 2 The Commission reasoned that "intimacy demands restraint lest the uninformed be
exploited." 2 2
In Cady, Roberts, the Commission established the now classic rule against
insider trading:
[I]nsiders must disclose material facts which are known to them by
virtue of their position but which are not known to persons with whom
they deal and which, if known, would affect their investment judgment. Failure to disclose in these circumstances constitutes a violation of the anti-fraud provisions. If, on the other hand, disclosure
prior to effecting a purchase or sale would be.improper or unrealistic
under the circumstances, we believe the alternative is to forego the
23
transaction.
Thus was born the disclose-or-abstain rule, the violation of which, when combined with a duty to disclose, constitutes illegal insider trading.
Four years later, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur,2" the Commission, relying upon Cady, Roberts, brought an injunctive action against Texas Gulf
Sulphur (Texas Gulf) and certain of its officers and directors for violations
of rule lOb-5. The Commission's claims stemmed from the issuance of press
releases and the purchase of shares of Texas Gulf by directors, officers, and
others during the period of time that mineral discoveries were taking place
in Canada.2" The Commission's complaint included allegations that the
individual defendants, knowing of the mineral discoveries, had engaged in
securities transactions on their own behalf and had revealed the drilling information to other persons who relied on the information to purchase Texas Gulf
securities. 26
The district court meticulously analyzed the precedents under the com20. Id.at 912.
21. See id.
22. Id.
23. Id.at 911.
24. 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd in part and rev'd inpart, 401 F.2d 833 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
25. 258 F. Supp. at 273.
26. Id.
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mon law and rule lOb-S and found- that insiders subject to the disclosure
requirements of section 10(b) and rule IOb-5 may includ& i'employees as well
as officers, directors, and controlling stockholders who are, in possession of
material undisclosed ififormation obtained in the course of their employment,"
and that a disclose-or-abstain rul6 was appropriate .2 7 The district court,
however', would not impose liability on a direcor who did not himself trade,
but who tipped his son-in-law within minutes of a public release concerning
the mineral discoveries- 8 The court declined the explicit request by the Commission to fix a reasonable waiting period after an announcement was made
during which insiders cannot-trade, on the ground that it would be "more
appropriafely done by'the Commission... with broad rule-making powers"
or by Congress. 29..
On appeal, the Commission convinced the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit to reverse in part and find the tipper-director liable."0 The court selectively quoted the Cady,--Roberts two-pronged-test, omitting the portion which
provides that aperson sought-to be charged must have "a relationship giving
access" to information2' The court instead concluded that "anyone... trading
for his own account. . . [who] has 'access " and is in possession of material
nonpublic information must either'disclose it or abstain from trading in or2
recommending that others do so while the information remains undisclosed.1
More importantly, the court -in"Texas Gulf-.moved -to a' parity of
information theory based in part on Cady, Roberts. On the facts themselves,
however, the court, as did the district judge, could have based liability for
all defendants, including the so-called "tipper," on a fiduciary duty theory.
The court-instead reasoned.that "[rule [10b-5] is based in policy on the
justifiable expec-tation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading
on impersonal xch anges have relatively equal access to material :information
..." Thus, early in the formative stages of rule lb_-5's application to insider
trading, the"'special obligatio!n" theory underlying fiduciary duties was broadly
34
li ked to an "equal -access" theory underlying concepts of fairness.

27. See id. "at 279; see also Olive v. Oiver, 118 Ga: 362, 45 S.E. 232, 234 (1903). ("It
might be that the director was in .possession ofinformation which his duty-to the company required

him to keep secret; and, if so, he must not disclose the fact even to the shareholder, for his
obligation to the company overrides that to an individual holder of the stock. But if the fact
so known to the director cannot be published, it does not follow that he may use it to his own
advantage, and to the disadvantage of one whom he also represents. The very fact that he cannot
disclose prevents him from dealing with one who does not know, and to whom material informa-

tion cannot be made known.").
28. See 258 F. Supp. at 289.

29. Id.
30. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 852.
31. See'Id. at'848.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 848, 851-52.
34. It would not be for twelve years until the Supreme Court dealt an apparently fatal
blow to the equal access theory. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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In 1969 the Commission was ready to expand upon the parity of information, or unfairness, theory, which the Second Circuit had adopted in Texas
Gulf. It was given its opportunity in facts which produced three notable
precedents: In re MerrillLynch, Pierce, Fenner &'Smith, Inc.,1 In re Investors
Management Co., Inc.,", and Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith."
In 1968, the Commission brought administrative proceedings against Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (Merrill Lynch) and certain customers
of Merrill Lynch after an investigation revealed that the investment banking
firm had received non-public information concerning a drop in the earnings
of an airplane company for whom Merrill Lynch was planning to 'underwrite
a debt offering. 8 Merrill Lynch had disclosed that information to select
customers of the firm.3 9 These customers had sold shares- of the airplane company, while Merrill Lynch had continued to buy stock in the airplane company for other customers without disclosing the adverse information.4 Merrill
Lynch offered to settle its proceeding and the Commission accepted-the offer,
in part because of the firm's showing that it'had constructed a wall, later
to be known as a "Chinese wall," between the two sides of its firm, under4
writing and retail.
In the Investors Management Co. proceeding against the sellers tipped
by Merrill Lynch, the Commission rejected the argument that Merrill Lynch
and, derivatively, the tipped sellers, had no duty to disclose.4 2 The duty to
disclose information arose,' according to the majority of the Commission, when
three elements were present: (1) the information acquired is material and nonpublic; (2) the tippee knows that it is nonpublic and was acquired improperly;
and (3) "the information [was] -a factor' in his decision' to effect the
43
transaction.'"
The Commission held that one who obtains possession of such information, which he knows emanates from the corporation, and which places him

35. 43 S.E.C, 933 (1968).
36. 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971). The Investors Management Co. decision by the'Commission was
unique from a procedural context alone After the hearing examiner had found that the respondents,
institutional investors, had willfully violated or aided and' abetted violations of, among other.

things, § 10(b) and rule lOb-5, the Commission on its own motion, when no petition for review
was filed, decided that since the "legal issues raised respecting the obligations of persons other
than corporate insiders who receive non-public corporate information (sometimes referred to as
'tippees') had significant implications for the securities industry and investing public, we deemed
it appropriate to consider those issues and express our views on tbiem." 44 S.E.C. at 635.
37. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
38. See Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. af 636.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 636-39.
41. See Merrill Lynch, 43 S.E.C. at 938.
42. See Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. at 643.
43. Id.at 641.
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"in a position superior to other investors.., thereby acquiresa relationship
with respect to that information within the purview and restraints of the
antifraud provisions." 4 4 Thus, according to the Commission, the duty to
disclose arose not from a fiduciary relationship, but from possession of the
information; therefore, the so-called "remote tippees," those who were tip-

ped by Merrill Lynch's salesmen, were equally culpable.4 5 Thus, what had

started as an analysis based on two standards, special relationship and un-

fairness, was reduced to the single issue of unfairness. This mutation did not
escape the attention of Commissioner Richard Smith whose concurring opinion in Investment Management Co. chastised the Commission majority for
focusing on the policing of information and its possession, rather than on
the duties owed by, and conduct of, corporate insiders.4 For Commissioner
Smith, the key to Merrill Lynch's and the sellers' liability was not possession
of information and trading on that information, but the special relationship
between Merrill Lynch and the issuer and the sellers' knowledge of that special
relationship as the source of the information."7
Unlike Cady, Roberts, Texas Gulf Sulphur and the earlier cases, the Merrill
Lynch trilogy 8 imposed insider trading liability upon a category of outsiders,
such as underwriters, who had utilized non-public information received on
a confidential basis for purposes beyond what was intended when the information was conveyed. These outsiders were thought to be virtually equivalent
to traditional insiders because of their entry into fiduciary relationships with
the issuer corporation and its shareholders." 9 But, despite virtual equivalence,
the fact remains that the Commission had successfully extended the unfairness
theory beyond the circle of traditional insiders, and would now begin to grope
with groups of outsiders who either could not easily be thought of as virtual

equivalents to traditional insiders or who lacked special relationships with issuer
corporations or their shareholders.
44. Id. at 644. (Emphasis added).
45. See id. at 645. The Commission noted the hearing examiner's exculpation of one
investment banking firm because the junior analyst who received the information did not communicate it to his superior who made the investment decision, thus upholding the defense that
the sale, even while in possession of the information, was not made "on the basis" of it. See
id. at 647 n.28; infra text accompanying notes 141-43.
46. See Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. at 648.
47. See id.
48. The third case in the Merrill Lynch trilogy was Shapiro v. MerrillLynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., in which the Second Circuit reaffirmed Texas Gulf Sulphur but went beyond
it to hold that defendants owed a duty "to all persons" who bought the stock of the airplane
company during the period that the sellers were disposing of their stock. Sharipo v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 1974).
49. See Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (involving purchases by close
friends of issuer's officers and directors, pursuant to secret arrangement to share profits: "in
determining whether a person, not a director or officer, is a corporate insider it seems ... that
the test is whether he had such a relationship to the corporation that he had access to information which should be used 'only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of
anyone.' ") (quoting In re Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961)). After Dirks v. SEC,
this category would be referred to as "temporary insiders." See Dirks v. SEC, 103 S.Ct. 3255,
3261 n.14 (1983).
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Corporate Outsiders-Market Information

Just as the Commission and the courts were opening the door of 10b-5
liability to include non-traditional corporate insiders trading on corporate
information obtained from the issuer, so too was liability being extended to
include persons trading on information not emanating from inside the corporate board room or corporate treasurer's office. This type of information,
called "market information," as distinguished from "corporate information,"
became the subject of intense scrutiny in the late 1960's and 1970's during
the ferment in the corporate world arising out of hostile take-overs, proxy
5
fights, and other externally imposed events on the corporation. '
Two definitions of "market information" were developed. The first, set
forth in a landmark law review article in 1973, defined the term as follows:
"Market information refers to information about events or circumstances which
affect the market for a company's securities but which do not affect the company's assets or earning power."'" The Commission, however, opted for a
broader definition which it articulated in In the Matter of Oppenheimer &
Co..52 The Commission stated that " '[m]arket information' refers to information which emanates from non-corporate sources and deals primarily with
information concerning or affecting the trading markets for a corporation's
securities."" The narrower definition was adopted by the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in Chiarellav. UnitedStates," and then by the Government in its brief to the Supreme Court in Chiarella.s" From the context of
the majority opinion in Chiarella,it appears that a majority of the Supreme
5 6
Court favors the narrower formulation.
The Oppenheimercase, which gave rise to the broad definition of market
information, arose in 1972 in the wake of Investment Management Co. The
Commission instituted private proceedings against Oppenheimer & Co., an
investment banking firm, to determine whether it violated rule lOb-5 by disclosing to several customers that an article, to appear in the Heard on the Street
column in the following day's Wall Street Journal, would refer to the firm's
analysis of a particular industry and would adversely affect the market price
of a particular common stock which such customers held in their portfolios."
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the conduct violated rule
10b-5 in that the firm had an obligation, stemming from Cady, Roberts, to
50. See Keown & Pinkerton, Merger Announcements and Insider TradingActivity: An Empirical Investigation, 36 Tn JouNrAL op FiNANcE 855 (1981).
51. Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An InitialInquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose
Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798, 799 (1973).
52. See [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 80,551, at 86,414 (Apr.
2, 1976).
53. Id. at 86,415 n.2.
54. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 n.8. (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd 445 U.S.
222 (1980).
55. Brief for the United States at 51 n. 34, Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
56. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 231 n.13.
57. See Oppenheimer, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 80,551,
at 86,415.
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disclose the information generally or abstain from trading.58 The ALJ made
no attempt to analyze the issues of duties owed to the issuer's shareholders,
or the firm's lack of any fiduciary relationship to the issuer. 'On appeal to
the 'Comimission, the ALJ's finding was overturned on the grounds that
the record did not justify imposition of liability ina case of first impression.51
In overruling the finding, however, the Commission went out of its way to
assert that "Itihere is today no question thatthe rmisuse of undisclosed, material
'market information' can be the basis of antifraud violations." 60
By 1976, when Oppenheimer was decided, the high water' point of rule
lOb-5 had beefi-reached. In that year, the Supreme Court decided Ernst &

Ernst v. Hochfelder,6 which put an end to the'theory that negligence would

suffice as a culpable state of mind under l0b-5. 62 in1977, the Court further
Sante Fe Industries v. Green,63
restricted theuse of rule '10b-5 by holding, in'
that a breach of-fiduciary duty by majority stockholders, without any deception, misrepresentation;'or 'n6fidisclosure, is not a violation of rule 10b-5.64
In 1980, in Chddrella, the Supreme Court attempted to bring a halt to
the parity of information or unfairness theories and firmly reattached rule
lOb-5 proscriptions against insider trading to concepts of duty and fiduciary
relationships arising out of insiders' relationships to their stockholders. 6'
Chiarella'arose in1977 when the Commission obtained a consent injunction
against Vincent Chiarella, a printer who had acquired access to coded Schedules
.13b and had.tbrokeri the code, had purchased stock in' the companies about
to be taken oyer, and had subsequently sold the stock for a profit after the
biddingecompanies l ublicly announced their taikeover intent.66 In January 1978,
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
a seventeen-count indictinent was returned against Chiarella for violating section 10(b) -adiule 10b-5 by failing to disclose to the shareholders of the target
companies the maerial'informati
e had learned from, the coded Schedules
13D, w ie similt aeoiusiy trading on the inf6rmation.1 After trial and cohviction,'the Second Circuit (per then Chief Judge Kaufman) affirmed his
coiviction, 6 upon finding that "[a]nyone-corporate insider- or not-who
regula'lyreceiies materi al nonpublic-information may not use that information to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose." ' 69
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, by a five to four decision, rejected
.58. See-id. at-86,419-2.,59. See id-at 86,415 n.4.
60. See id. at 86,415.
.,61. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).62. See id. at 214-15.
,
63430 U.S. 462 (1977), ,

-

.-

64. See id. at 476.
65. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
66. See id,,at 224,-230. -

.
-

67. See United States v. Chiarela, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED.Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 96,400
.
-.
68. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978).

(S.D.N.Y. 1978)

69. See id, at 1365.

-

1984]

INSIDER TRADING SANCTIONS ACT

the parity of information theory.70 The Court concluded that "[w]hen an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a
duty to speak. We hold that a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not- arise
from the mere possdssion of nonpublic market information." 7 Thus, since
Chiarella was neither an insider nor had a relationship with an insider from
which a fiduciary relationship could be inferred, the Court concluded that
he owed no duty to the shareholders of the target companies who sold their
shares without the benefit of the information le-possessed. 72
E. MisappropriationTheory is Born
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Government in Chiarella offered
an alternative theory to the Court to sustain Chiarella's conviction, arguing
that Chiarella had breached a duty owed to the acquiring corporation when
he acted upon information made available to him by virtue of his employment by a company employed by the acquiring corporation." That duty was
not accepted by the majority' of the Court because, in its view, the-theory
was not properly presented to the jury. 74 But in a 'footnote in the maj-ority
opinion, the majority attempted to dispose of the dissenting views of Chief
Justice Burger, who would have affirmed Chiarella's conviction on the basis
that Chiarella had a duty to disclose arising out of the misappropriation of
the market information. 75 However, the footnote did not dispose of the issue.
Rather, it highlighted the issue and gave the Commission and the Justice
76
Department reason to believe that persons breaching duties to their'employers,
'
or indeed, duties-even to fathers," or newspaper readers,'7 could be held civilly
or criminally liable for trading on material nonpublic information to which
they were not legally entitled.
In light of the clarification and narrowing of th law of rule 10b-S'by
the Chiarellamajority, the Burger dissent in Chiarellais an impoitant signal
70. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980).
71. Id. at 235.
72. See id. at 231-34.
73. See Brief for the United States at 49-71, Chiarella v. United States,-445 U.S. 222.(1980).
74. See 445 U.S. at 236, 237 n.21.
75. See id.
76. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
193 (1983); see also S.E.C. v. Materia, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE,. (CCH)
199,526 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1983), amended, 1199,543 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1983), 99,583 S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 5, 1983), aff'd, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 91,861 (2d Cir. Oct. 1, 1984); SEC
v. Musella, [Current] FED. SEC. L.-RP. (CCH) 1 91,416 (S-DN.Y. Apr. 5, 1984).
77. See United States v. Thomas C. Reed, Indictment No. 84 Crim. 610 (RJW), U.S. District
Court, Southern District of New York ("Gordon W. Reed and Thomas C.,Reed had a special
relationship of trust and confidence ...").
78. See United States v- R. Foster Winans, et al., Indictment No. 84 Crim. 605 (CS), U.S.
District Court, Southern District of New York ("[defendant] violated his duties owed to the readers
of the Wall Street Journal.. ."). After the indictment was filed, the Government announced
it would not prosecute on this theory, but the Commission's prosecution of the parallel civil
proceeding, S.E.C. v. Brandt, is still proceeding on the duty to readers theory.
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that, in the view of as many as four Justices, rule lOb-5 should be read expansively to "reach any person engaged in any fraudulent scheme." 9 The Chief
Justice quoted approvingly Cady, Roberts' two-pronged test of "access" and
"unfairness"; but, in so doing, the Chief Justice omitted mention of the facts
that the person who traded in Cady, Roberts was related by employment to
a true insider of the issuer, and that the information involved was true corporate information. 0 The Chief Justice's dissent dealt with the distinction
between market and corporate information only in passing, by arguing that
neither the statute nor the rule made such a distinction."' In the Chief Justice's
eyes, Chiarella was simply a tippee who illegally gained access to nonpublic
information and thereby acquired an "informational advantage" which could
not be allowed.8 2
It did not take the Commission or the Justice Department long to test
the acceptability of the "misappropriation" theory."3 In United States v.
Newman, 4 the government obtained the indictment of James Newman, a tippee
of employees of two investment banking firms all of whom were in a conspiracy to trade on the basis of information about pending, but secret, mergers
and acquisitions in which their firms were involved."5
The lower court dismissed the Newman indictment, 6 relying primarily on
the authority of Chiarella, but, on appeal, the Second Circuit set about to
resurrect a broad basis of lOb-5 liability.' 7 First, the Second Circuit read
Chiarellaas essentially a decision turning on a question of improper pleading
by noting that "[a]s the [Supreme] Court observed, '[t]he jury was not
instructed on the nature or elements of a duty owed by petitioner to anyone
other than the sellers.' (Citation omitted.) To remedy the deficiency in Chiarella,
the Government here has pointed its charge of wrongdoing in a different
direction."" The indictment charged that Newman aided and abetted the
breaches by the two employees of the "duties of honesty, loyalty, ard silence"
owed to their employers, that such breaches constituted "fraud," and that
such fraud, when linked with the purchase of securities, constituted a criminal
violation of rule 10b-5." 9 The court disregarded the fact that neither Newman,
his cohorts, the investment banking firms nor their clients were under a duty
79. See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 240 (emphasis in original) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (Justices
Stephens, Brennan and Marshall agreed with the Chief Justice's conclusion.).
80. See id. at 241-42.
81. See id. at 240-41 n.l.
82. See id. at 245.
83. In an almost immediate reaction to Chiarella,the Commission promulgated rule 14e-3
to make unlawful the purchase by a tender offeror's tippee of a target company's stock. See 17
C.F.R. 240.14e-3 (1984).
84. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 193 (1983).
85. See id. at 15.
86. See United States v. Courtois, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,024
(S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981).
87. See Newman, 664 F.2d at 16.
88. Id. at 15.
89. See id. at 16.
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to disclose to the sellers of the target company securities that a take-over was
about to occur. 90 The court, however, upheld the validity of the indictment
and adopted a broad view of "fraud," relying on the misappropriation theory
suggested in the Burger dissent in Chiarella,9' without analyzing how such
theory squares with the need to find a duty to disclose to issuer shareholders
or how it squares with traditional notions that there 2need be a purchaser or
seller defrauded to create a violation of rule 10b-5.1
In light of the stress placed by the Chiarellamajority upon the need to
find such a duty, it is remarkable that the Second Circuit does not once allude
to this issue in Newman, but instead devotes nearly its entire analysis to justifying its conclusion that the activity of Newman and his cohorts was
"fraudulent." But for what purpose is the conduct labelled "fraudulent" and
as to whom is the conduct "fraudulent"? In Newman, the question of whether
of necessity a fraud be perpetrated upon purchasers or sellers under the
securities laws was put to one side without evident analysis, as was the thrust
of Sante Fe Industries and Chiarella, that an activity which might be considered "fraud" for some purposes, might not be fraud for purposes of rule
lOb-5. 91
In adopting the dissenting view of Chef Justice Burger in Chiarella and
avoiding the broader questions raised by the so-called misappropriation theory,
the Second Circuit, in Newman, extended rule lOb-5 liability to an area well
beyond what the Supreme Court had contemplated in Hochfelder, Sante Fe
Industries, or in Chiarella.The essence of rule lOb-5 is deception by a person
of a purchaser or seller in connection with the purchase or sale of securities,
not simply fraud of some variety "touching" a purchase or sale. Since the
misappropriation theory premises liability on a person's possession of information and such person's relationship with the person or entity from whom
the information was obtained, and not between the possessor and the purchasers
or sellers who may be on the other side of trades, the obvious anomoly exists
that the person who trades may be criminally liable but will not be civilly

90. See id.
91. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240.
92. See Newman, 664 F.2d at 16; see also Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life
& Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
93. The "fraud, therefore 10b-5 violation" analysis not only does violence to Chiarella
but also to Santa Fe Industries v. Green:
To the extent that... the term 'fraud' in Rule lob-5 [would be used] to bring within
the ambit of the Rule all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities
transaction, its interpretation would, like the interpretation rejected by the Court in
Ernst & Ernst, 'add a gloss to the operative language of the statute quite different
from its commonly accepted meaning.' " (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 165 (1976)).
Santa Fe Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977). See also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318
U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943) ("But to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction
to further inquiry, to whom is he a fiduciary? What obligation does he owe as a fiduciary?").
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liable to the persons.who purchased or sold without access to the information. '
This anomaly, seems fatal to the misappropriation theory for it deprives the
victim of a remedy, dislodges the theory from the roots of issuer-investor protection, and reopens 10b-Sto a potential expansion well beyond insider trading,
to encompass all possibilities of "fraud" so long as there is a purchase or
sale of :securities "touching" the fraud.
To date only the Second Circuit has opined-on the misappropriation theory.
In that-circuit's most recent decision on misappropriation, SEC v. Materia,"
the cour again failed to address the question of how the theory could be consistent with Chiarella. Judge Kaufman (who authored the sweeping decision
in Chiarellalater reversed by the Supreme Court) once again, addressed the
question of a printer's liability under rule lOb-5 (and also rule 14e-3) where
he "stole information. . . and traded on [it] to his pecuniary advantage [after
he had] divine[d]'the identities of ... four tender offer targets." 96 Never
mentioning the later-decided. Dirks v. SEC,1" only once referring to the
substantive holding of Chiarella," but, as. in Newman, relying substantively
on Burger's dissent in Chiarella,91 the court reaffirmed its adherence to a broad
definition of fraud and deceit, without regard to the lack of a "duty to speak"
to selling shareholders, which would preclude civil liability for damages.' °
Relying ont a single phrase in the 1934.Senate Report on section 10(b),' 0 ' the
court, erected and demolished the straw, man argument that section 10(b) was
' 2
"aimed solely at the eradication of fraudulent-trading by corporate insiders.'
The court stated that its decision was not governed by Chiarella because
Chiarella "did not-. .disayow the misappropriation theory,'" 3 which was
an "alternate basis," for, the Second Circuit's affirmance of Chiarella's
qonviction.0'4 However, ashthe Supreme Court.itself observed, " the jury in
Chiarella's trial was not adequately charged on.the misappropriation theory,
so the Second Circuit's so-called "alternate basis" was not sufficient to sus,tain the conviction.
In any case, the Second Circuit then neatly disposed of.Chiarellaaltogether.
Arguing that the duty analysis relied on in Moss stemmed from the need to

94. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1280 (1984).

.

.95. [urrent] FEb. SEC. L. REP; (CCI)

91,681, at 99,447 (2d'Cir. Oct. 1, 1984).

96. Id'. at 99,447-48.97. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983). a2
-"98. See Chiaella,"445 U.S" ai235.
99. See id. at 239 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
100. See Moss v. Morgan' Sfanley Inc., 719 F.2d'at 12-13.'
'101."See S.EC. V. Materia, [Current] FEb. SEc. L.' RP.' '91,681 at 99,449 ("Legislative
histoiy to'the f1934 Aci] makes clearthat the antifraud-provision was intended to be broad in
scope, 'efncompassing all 'manipulative and deceptive practices which-have been demonstrated
to fulfill jo useful function.' S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong.,' 2d Sess. 6, '(1934)").
102. See id.

103. Id. at 99,450.

104. See id. (court relies-on Chiarella,'588 F.2d at ,1368, n.14.)
105. 'See Chiarilla 445 U.S. at 236-37.
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deal with burgeoning private rights of action and such "ancillary issues-...
as standing ... and whether a defendant has breached a duty to a particular
plaintiff,"' 0 6 the court stated, "[a]t the-risk of repetition, we stress that-such
analysis [that defendant owed no duty to selling shareholders] bears only on
the type of question raised in a private suit for damages;-it is not relevant
to an inquiry into whether the Rule was or was not contravened" (emphasis
added).'0 7 This argument, of course;, omits the highly material fact that
Chiarellaitself was decided on such an analysis of duties to shareholders; if
the analysis employed by the Supreme Court majority in reversing a criminal
conviction of rule lOb-5 is relevant only in a private claim for damages, then,
according to the Second Circuit, Chiarella is to be ignored.
Notwithstanding the Second Circuit's unwillingness to examine. critically
the misappropriation theory, it is clear that the fiduciary duty owed to
employers, which Chiarella, Newman's cohorts, and Materia violated,-is fundamentally different from the duty, stressed in Chiarella, arising out of the
insider's relationship to his shareholders. The insider's duty arises out of the
C"special circumstances" of a person's holding another person's property in
trust. When the trustee knows a fact affecting the value of the property he
holds in trust, he is obligated to disclose that fact before acting on it for his
personal advantage. The alternative to disclosure is silence and non-action.
But an employee's duty not to sully his employer's reputation has nothing
analytically to do with the duty to disclose or abstain. As the commentators
have observed, 108 to whom would the employee disclose without further injuring his employer's interest? Since, with respect to issuer shareholders,- the
employee holds nothing in trust, the employee owes no duty to such
shareholders. If the employee injures his employer's reputation by breaking
rules of confidentiality, the employer has civil remedies against the employee.
As the Court in Chiarellaemphasized, where there is "no-relationship of trust
and confidence between parties to a transaction," there is no duty to disclose
or abstain, which has always been the essence-of the violation-of rule lOb-5.109
F. SEC v. Dirks-Tippee Liability Refined
Meanwhile, another case was on its way to the Supreme Court which provided the Court with another opportunity to clarify its views on the scope
of lOb-5 liability for insider trading. In 1973, while acting as an insurance
analyst for a broker-dealer, Raymond Dirks met with and was told by Ronald
Secrist, a former employee of Equity Funding Insurance Co. (Equity Funding), that a major fraud was being perpetrated at Equity Funding through
the booking of nonexistent insurance policies." 0 Neither Dirks nor the firm
106. See Materia, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,681 -at-99,450.
107. See id. at 99,451.
108. See Loss, supra note 10, at 869-70 n.40 (Supp. 1984); Phillips, Insider TradingLiability
After Dirks, 16 REv. SEc. REG. 841, 845-46 (1983).'

109. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230.
110. In re Dirks, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.(CCH)
83,943 (Jan. 22, 1981).

82,812, at 83,941,
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he worked for owned any of the stock of Equity Funding, but during the
extensive inquiry he made in order to verify the accuracy of the fraudulent
policy story he had been told, he did tell a number of his customers who owned
Equity Funding securities of the Equity Funding fraud and they in turn sold. "'
The Commission's investigation into the scandal-ridden company included an
inquiry into Dirks' conduct and charged that he had aided and abetted violations of rule 10b-5 by repeating the allegations of fraud to persons who sold
Equity Funding securities." 2 The Commission concluded that "where tippeesregardless of their motivation or occupation---come into possession of material
'corporate information that they know is confidential and know or should
know came from a corporate insider,' they must either publicly disclose that
information or refrain from trading.""' 3
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia entered judgment
against Dirks on the grounds stated in the Commission's opinion." 4 Later,
one member of the court issued an opinion stating that "the obligations of
corporate fiduciaries pass to all those to whom they disclose their information
before it has been disseminated to the public at large.""' This reasoning was
an attempt to fit Dirks, an outsider, into traditional insider garb.
In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court stressed that it had meant
what it said in Chiarella;insider trading liability is predicated not on possession of non-public information, but on a breach of fiduciary duty by an issuer's
agent, fiduciary, or person in whom the seller's trust and confidence was placed,
who traded on the basis of such information for personal gain."' The "discloseor-abstain" rule had previously been applied to direct or indirect tippees of
those who are prohibited from trading. In Cady, Roberts, the Commission
had found a violation by the brokerage firm and its partner for knowingly
trading while in possession of information tipped by one of its employees who
was a director of the issuer.' Dirks reaffirmed that analysis of tippee liability,
holding that persons who are not corporate insiders are liable only if they
trade on information which they know is material, non-public, and given to
them in breach of an insider's fiduciary duty to the issuer corporation. '8
But Dirks further refined the analysis by holding that there is a "requirement of a specific relationship between the shareholders and the individual
trading on insider information.. .. "19 Thus, whether there has been a breach
of duty by the tipper depends in the first instance on whether the tipper
"receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as
a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future

ill.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See id. at 83,944.
See id. at 83,950.
Id. at 83,945 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12).
See Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Id.at 839.
See Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3263-64.
See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
See Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3262-64.
Id. at 3261.
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earnings. ' 0 The requirement may also be met where the insider, in effect,
makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend."' If
the tipper has breached a duty, the tippee will be liable if he knew or should
have known that there has been a breach. 2 2 This requirement that the tipper's
conduct be found improper was a considerable expansion on prior law, which
only focused on whether the insider-tipper had possession of material nonpublic information and tipped to someone who knew the quality of the information and that it was improper to act on the information.12 Thus, since
Secrist's disclosure to Dirks was not in breach of Secrist's duties to Equity
Funding, Dirks was not liable as a tippee.'24
III.

TBE INsIDER TRADING SANCTONS AcT-As PASSED

With this brief background of the law of insider trading, we turn to an
analysis of the Act. As passed, the Act on its face appeared to do no more
than what the Commission had requested, add a layer of sanctions to the
existing statutory and judicial sanctions of injunction, disgorgement, and other
ancillary relief, to beef up the disincentives to insider trading.' 2 The Act gives
the Commission authority to seek a civil money penalty of up to three times
the amount of "profit gained or loss avoided" from a person who violates,
or aids and abets a violation of, the federal securities laws by purchasing or
selling a security while in possession of material nonpublic information.' In
addition, responding to statements made at the House and Senate hearings
regarding abuses with respect to the use of stock options, the Act also contained a provision making the purchase or sale of a derivative security, such
as a put, call, straddle, or option, or a group or index of securities including
such security, while in possession of material nonpublic information, equally
a violation of the Act as the purchase or sale of the underlying security would
27
be.
The Act does place some limit on liability. For example, the Act provides
that no person is subject to the civil sanction solely for aiding and abetting
another in a manner "other than by communicating material non-public
information."'' 21 Furthermore, section 20 "control person" liability does not
apply to a sanctions action, nor does respondeatsuperiorliability. 29 Finally,
120. Id. at 3266.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See In re Investors Management, Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 651.
124. See Dirks, 103 S. Ct. at 3267-68.
125. See Memorandum In Support, supra note 2, at 1706.
126. The Act, supra note 1, at § 2A (amending § 21 of 1934 Act). The Act also amends
sections of the 1934 Act to increase the criminal fine for criminal violations of the 1934 Act
from $10,000 to $100,000, and to give the Commission authority to bring an administrative proceeding against persons who violate § 14 of the Act. See id. at §§ 3, 4 (amending § 15(c)(4)
of 1934 Act).
127. See id. at § 5.
128. Id. at § 2B.
129. See id.; see also HousE REPoRT, supra note 3, at 9.
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the Act applie&only to transactions on'or through the facilities of a national
securities exchange or from. or through a broker or dealer, and .not to any
public offering by an issuer, of' securities other than, standardized options, 3
The Ac't's language as-it relates to primary and secondary liability raises
a number of. significant questions in light of the three separate and intellectually divergent -interpretations of rule 1Ob-5,. as: applied to insider trading,
which are described above. First, what kind of "person" .does the Act cover?
Does it, for example, cover the financial analyst whose sleuthing and personal
relationships with. middle-level- managers of public companies gives him or
her access to bits and pieces of information which, when combined with the
analyst's deep understanding of the industry in question, gives the analyst a
particular-insight into the company-and which, when considered in hindsight,
might be thought of as material nonpublic-information?'I Does the language
codify Newinan 2 and Matedia and overturn Chiarelhi' " so that any person
who trades while in possession of information acquired and used in breach
of obligations owed to 6thers is, liable 'under' iOb-5, without regard to duty
or relationsip to -the issuer? Finally, what does the language mean with respect
to tippees who bestow no pecuniary reationships on tippers', and who
themselves' have violated no duty by 'tipping?. ":.
.
The legislative history of the Act is not helpful in 'answering these questiois, especially since in the-post-Dirksperiod, the Commission's spokespersons in) interviews stated- that Dirks would-not inhibitf their enforcement
efforts,'" and in congressional testimony, asserted' that the term "insider
36
trading" included persons who misapprop'riate information about an issuer,'
Furthermore, the House Report on the Act expressed the view that a "narrow" bonstruction Of Dirks was appropriate," and virtually adopted in haec
veiba the C6mmission's enforcement position on the limited construction of
Dirks and expanded con-struction of fraud. i3S The House Report alsoignores
130. The Act, supra note 1-,at § 2A. The Act also contains a five year statute of limitations.
See id._ at § 2D (amending § 21 of 1934 Act).
131. See Dirks y, SEC, 103 S. Ct. at 3263; see" also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
at 233-34 n.16.
"
132:664 F2d -12 ,(2d 'Cir.- 1981)
-.
133, [Current]lFED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) _ 91,681 (2d _Cir. 1984).
134. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
135. See 15 SEc. REG. & L. PEP. (BNA) No. 27, 1293-94 (July 8, 1983).
136. See Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 15.
137. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 4("Underwriters, investment analysts, lawyers,

accountants, financial printers, government officials, and others often learn of profit-or-loss
forecasts, imminent tender offers, mineral strikes, oil'discoveries, lucrative contracts, and product
failures before such information is available to the investing public: Insider trading by such persons undermines confidence in the markets in the same manner as trading by corporate insiders.
The SupreimeCourt recently noted that under-certain conditions, such as where corporate information is revealed legitimately to'an underwriter,'accountant, lawyer or consultant working for
the corporation, those "outsiders" may be treated as constructive insiders. The Committee agrees
with this analysis and expects the Commission to continue to pursue violations by such persons.").
138. See Levine, Insider TradingAct Broadens Enforcement Scope, Legal Times, Sept. 10,

1984, at 17, col. 4.
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the distinctions between market and corporate information.

39

Finally, the

House Report cites as an example of a "person" who should be subject to
rule 10b-5 a purchaser of securities of a target company armed with secret
information derived from the bidder's investment banker. 140 This example is,
of course, the case of Chiarella, Newman and Materia. To conclude, as the

House Committee does, that "Congress has not sanctioned" such "deceitful

4
misappropriation of information . . . under the federal securities laws"' '1
is ominous news for those who take at face value the statement that the Act
does not change the state of the law. From these examples, the Act arguably
codifies the Burger dissent in Chiarella,as well as the Second Circuit's opinions
in Newman and Materia.

Second, the words "while in possession of" may change the generally
understood causation standard which the Commission must prove, that the
trading was motivated by the material non-public information.' 2 The Commission spokespersons at the hearings were quite ambivalent about this ques-

tion, testifying that the use of the words "while in possession of" did not
change the current state of the law,'

3

but also using "on the basis of" language

to describe current enforcement efforts."' Thus, the standard of causation
is at least ambiguous, and unfortunately so, because of the importance of
this issue to the proper functioning of multi-service investment banking firms
that may acquire information from a variety of sources and may trade while
in technical possession of it but not because of it.
Third, the "aiding and abetting" language of section 2(B) of the Act purports to limit the applicability of the increased penalty only to those persons
who communicate material nonpublic information. ' 5 It is at the outset noteworthy that as of this date the Supreme Court has declined to address the
139. See HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 4.
140. See id.
141. Id.at 5.
142. See 3 JACOBS, Rule lOb-5, 66.02[c] n.64 (1981); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 852 n.14 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 222"(1980); Jefferies & Co. v. ArkusDuntov, 357 F. Supp. 1206, 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F. Supp. 255, 265,
267 (D. Ore. 1972); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 644 (1971); Faberge, Inc.,
Exchange Act Release No. 10174 (May 25, 1973); Bromberg, Tippee Risks and Liabilities, 12
CoRP. PRAC. COMMENTATOR 411, 415-18 (1971); see also Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 1974); Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz,
464 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
143. See House Hearings I, supra note 3, at 49 (testimony of John Fedders, Director of
the Division of Enforcement) (stating both that "the proposed legislation ... does not at the
present time at all impact the existing case law with regard to insider trading .... [a]nd ...
does not impact the 'based on,' 'in possession of,' or a 'knowing' standard at all" and also
that he knew "of no decision where the Court has abandoned the 'in possession theory.' ").
144. See House HearingsI1, supra note 3, at 36 (statement of John Shad) ("Trading on
the basis of material nonpublic information-a practice which impairs confidence in the integrity
of the securities markets-has been the subject of a number of recent cases .... The [Dirks]
decision strongly reaffirmed that both insider and tippee trading on the basisof nonpublic, material
information is prohibited under the federal securities laws ...... ") (emphasis added).
145. See The Act, supra note 1, at § 2B.
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issue of the applicability of the aiding and abetting theory of liability under
the securities laws,' 4 6 so one is struck immediately by the inappropriateness
of dealing with that issue through an apparent sanctions-only act. 47 This section could mean that "tippers" of material nonpublic information may be
held as "aiders and abettors" and thus subject to treble damages, while other
persons who, for example, knowingly aid and abet another's violation by
executing the orders of the tippers or performing other acts necessary to enable
the tipper to trade, but who do not themselves "communicate material nonpublic information," cannot be held as aiders and abettors. 48 But what of
the broker-dealer firm whose agent-broker did, in fact, communicate material
nonpublic information in an unauthorized and unsanctioned manner; might
not the firm be found liable for treble damages under the so-called exclusion?
And what of the broker who, knowing only that his customer has a relationship either with a fiduciary of the issuer or with a fiduciary of a person with
market information, "follows" his customer's successful trades by telling his
other customers to buy or sell? Could the communication of material nonpublic information alone, without knowledge that the information is of such
character, give rise to treble damage liability? Succeeding sections of the socalled exemption do not give greater comfort, even though they do purport
to relieve securities firms from "control person" liability, because section 20
is not the exclusive method by which most courts have found securities firms
liable for the acts of their errant employee-agents. 4 The doctrine of respondeat
superioris in fact frequently used and, despite the House Report's assurance
that the "Commission would not be permitted to seek the [treble damage]
sanction under the theory of respondeatsuperior against an employer solely
because his employee or agent violated the law," "' the dual concerns are that
such a statement does not encompass the full law of respondeatsuperior and
that an aggressive and creative Commission Enforcement staff and a receptive court could find that inadequate supervisory procedures were the cause
of the violation, thus vitiating the exclusion. Indeed, the House Report refers
in a laudatory manner to the Commission's finding of aiding and abetting
based upon a failure by a broker-dealer to supervise a violator."'

146. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 191-92 n.7 (1976).
147. See Senate Hearings,supra note 3, at 129-31 (testimony of Sam Scott Miller for the
Securities Industry Association).
148. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 9.
149. See Fitzpatrick & Carman, Respondeat Superior and the Federal Securities Laws: A

Round Peg in a Square Hole, 12 Ho-s, AL.REv. 1 (1983); see also Brief for SEC, Investor
Research Corporation v. SEC, 628 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir.) (expansionist interpretation of respondeat
superior by Commission staff), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980); SEC Brief as amicus curiae
at 5, Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d 880 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1097 (1981).
150. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 9.

151. See id. at 10.
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CONCLUSION

As of this writing, the Act has been used by the Commission in only one
of its enforcement actions, S.E.C. v. FedericoAblan,' 52 a traditional corporate
insider trading action, which is, at this writing, being contested. Issues of
statutory and consitutional interpretation undoubtedly will be raised when
the Commission seeks the enhanced sanctions. The need for additional legislation to cure the many problems now existing because of the confused state
of the law, the open conflict among Justices of the Supreme Court, as well
as among Court decisions and lower court interpretations, and the number
of open questions raised by the Act, could not be more clear. Professor Loss,
the reporter of the now-dormant American Law Institute Federal Securities
Code, has called for legislation, "going beyond patchwork." ' 53 Meanwhile,
the American Bar Association's Task Force on Insider Trading Regulation
has prepared a lengthy analysis of the state of the law, not only under rule
10b-5, but also under section 16 and rule 14e-3, and may itself propose extensive legislation.'" 4 Such a legislative solution, to be joined in, one would hope,
by the Commission, is long overdue.

152. Civ. No. 84-8532 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see Litigation Release No. 10618, [Current] FED.
S c. L. REP. (CCH) 91,847 (Nov. 27, 1984).
153. See Loss, supra note 10, at 105 (Supp. 1984).
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